

```

EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AAAAAA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS
EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AAAAAA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS
EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AAAAAA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS
EE XX XX AA AA MMMM MMMM PP PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MMMM MMMM PP PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MMMM MMMM PP PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM MM PP PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM MM PP PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM MM PP PP LL EE SS
EEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS
EEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS
EEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PPPPPPPP LL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS
EE XX XX AAAAAAAAAA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AAAAAAAAAA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AAAAAAAAAA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LL EE SS
EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LLLLLLLLLL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS
EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LLLLLLLLLL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS
EEEEEEEEEE XX XX AA AA MM MM PP LLLLLLLLLL EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSS

```

F
C
I
0
-
D

```
DDDDDDDD      000000      DDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDD      000000      DDDDDDDD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DD   DD  00   00  DD   DD
DDDDDDDD      000000      DDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDD      000000      DDDDDDDD
```


```
EEEEEEEEEEEE  RRRRRRRR  AAAAAA  PPPPPPPP  AAAAAA  TTTTTTTTTT
EEEEEEEEEEEE  RRRRRRRR  AAAAAA  PPPPPPPP  AAAAAA  TTTTTTTTTT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP   PP  AA   AA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP   PP  AA   AA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP   PP  AA   AA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP   PP  AA   AA  TT
EEEEEEEEE  RRRRRRRR  AA   AA  PPPPPPPP  AA   AA  TT
EEEEEEEEE  RRRRRRRR  AA   AA  PPPPPPPP  AA   AA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AAAAAAAAAA  PP  AAAAAAAAAA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AAAAAAAAAA  PP  AAAAAAAAAA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP  AA   AA  TT
EE   RR   RR  AA   AA  PP  AA   AA  TT
EEEEEEEEEEEE  RR   RR  AA   AA  PP  AA   AA  TT
EEEEEEEEEEEE  RR   RR  AA   AA  PP  AA   AA  TT
```

....
....
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....

```
MM   MM  AAAAAA  RRRRRRRR
MM   MM  AAAAAA  RRRRRRRR
MMMM  MMMM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MMMM  MMMM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM  MM  MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM  MM  MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RRRRRRRR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RRRRRRRR
MM   MM  AAAAAAAAAA  RR  RR
MM   MM  AAAAAAAAAA  RR  RR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
MM   MM  AA   AA  RR   RR
```

.title DOD_ERAPAT - Generate DoD security erase patterns
.ident 'V03-000'

```

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```

```

++
: Facility:
:       VMS Executive
:
: Abstract:
:
:       This routine generates security erase patterns which are used by user
:       written programs to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of classified
:       information.
:
: Environment:
:
:       VAX/VMS, Kernel Mode
:
: Author:
:
:       Michael T. Rhodes,      Creation Date:  October, 1982
:
: Modified By:
:
:       V03-001 JRL0023      John R. Lawson, Jr.      10-Jul-1984 14:23
:       Add interface to the system.
--

```

.page

```

++
: FL
:
: CA
:
: II
:
: CA
:
--

```

.sbtll Declarations

\$ERADEF : Define function codes
 \$\$\$DEF : Define status codes

: Equated symbols:

TYPE = 4 : Offset to TYPE parameter (value)
 COUNT = 8 : Offset to COUNT parameter (value)
 PATADR = 12 : Offset to PATADR parameter (address)

: Assumptions:

ASSUME ERASK_MINTYPE EQ 1
 ASSUME ERASK_MAXTYPE EQ 3

ASSUME ERASK_MEMORY EQ 1
 ASSUME ERASK_DISK EQ 2
 ASSUME ERASK_TAPE EQ 3

.page
 .sbtll Loadable image header and trailer

: **
 Loader Information:

At boot time, SYSBOOT.EXE checks the SYSGEN parameter LOADERAPT (SGNSV LOADERAPT); if it is set, this image gets loaded from SYSSYSTEM:ERAPATLOA.EXE. There must exist, in the image, certain information for the loader; these two PSECT's supply that info.

: Linking this Object:

\$ link/notraceback/system=0/header/executable=SYSSYSTEM:ERAPATLOA -
 DOD_ERAPAT, SYSSYSTEM:SYS.STB/selective_search

The /SYSTEM qualifier guarantees that the PSECT's will be ordered alphabetically within the image, forcing \$\$\$\$\$\$\$ to be first and ----- to be last.

: This table must appear at the beginning of the image

.psect \$\$\$\$\$\$\$ page, pic : In a system image, the PSECT's
 PRMSW = 1 : are ordered alphabetically
 : flag to indicate loadable code

: This table directs SYSBOOT.EXE for loading the rest of this image
 :

```
SLVTAB subtype=DYN$C_NON_PAGED,-      : Non-paged pool
      end=DOD_ERAPAT$END,-          : Computed size of image
      sysvecs=VECTOR$S,-           : Vector into the routine
      prot_w=PRT$C_URKW,-          : Page protection
      facility=<DoD Security Erase>  : What is this?
```

: These vectors replace the default ones in SYS.EXE
 :

```
VECTOR$S:                          ; Vector table
      LOADVEC EXE$ERAPAT_VEC,5,,DOD_ERAPAT$
      .long -1                       ; Terminated by -1
```

: This label must appear at the end of the image
 :

```
.psect ----- byte, pic
```

```
DOD_ERAPAT$END::
```

```
.page
.sbttl $ERAPAT System Service
```

```
****
: $ERAPAT
```

: Functional Description:

To preclude the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, the caller iteratively invokes the \$ERAPAT system service. Upon each invocation, the user increments the iteration count and the service returns an erasure pattern plus either SSS_NORMAL or SSS_NOTRAN (which indicates the declassification procedure is complete).

: Calling sequence:

This routine should be called via a CALLS/G to EXE\$ERAPAT.

: Input:

```
TYPE(AP)      Security erase type. The legal types are
               1. ERASK_MEMORY : main memory
                  (volatile r/w semiconductor)
               2. ERASK_DISK  : disk storage
               3. ERASK_TAPE  : tape storage

COUNT(AP)    Iteration count. The service should be called
```

```

:           the first time with the value 1, then 2, etc.,
:           until the status SSS NOTRAN is returned. The
:           local symbol MAXCOUNT defines how many times this
:           happens.

```

```

: Output:

```

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: PATADR(AP)      Address of a longword into which the security
:                  erase pattern is to be written.

```

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: Routine value:

```

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: RO = SSS_ACCVIO      Pattern output area not accessible
:       SSS_BADPARAM   Invalid security type code
:       SSS_NORMAL     Normal successful completion
:       SSS_NOTRAN     Security erase complete

```

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: --

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: .page
: .sbttl  Data necessary for routine
: .psect  $DATAS long, pic

```

```

: Own Storage:

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```

: COUNTSS:

```

```

: .long 1           ; Main Memory iteration count
: .long 3           ; Disk Storage iteration count
: .long 2           ; Tape Storage iteration count

```

```

: PATTERNS$:           ; Storage type erasure patterns

```

```

: .long 0           ; Main memory erase pattern
: .long -1          ; Disk Storage erase pattern
: .long ^XDB6DB6DB ; Tape Storage erase pattern

```

```

: .page
: .sbttl  Routine to generate the erase patterns
: .psect  $CODES long, pic

```

```

: Routine to return erase patterns:

```

```

: DOD_ERAPATS:         ; $ERAPAT entry point

```

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:   pushr  ^M<r1>      ; Save registers

```

```

: Check the values of the parameters ...

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\$D

\$D

\$D

\$D

\$D

\$D

\$D

```

:
:   movzwl #SS$_BADPARAM, r0      ; Assume bad parameters
:   cpl    COUNT(ap), #0          ; Is count too small?
:   bleq   EXIT                  ; Branch if yes
:
:   cpl    TYPE(ap), #ERASK_MINTYPE ; Type code too small?
:   blss   EXIT                  ; Branch if yes
:   cpl    TYPE(ap), #ERASK_MAXTYPE ; Type code too large?
:   bgtr   EXIT                  ; Branch if yes
:
: Use the TYPE as an index into COUNTSS and PATTERNSS
:
:   subl3  #1, TYPE(ap), r1       ; Vectors begin with 0
:
: Signal completion by returning SS$_NOTRAN ...
:
:   movzwl #SS$_NOTRAN, r0        ; Set completion status
:   cpl    COUNT(ap), COUNTSS[r1] ; Are we done?
:   bgtr   EXIT                  ; Yes, return completion status
:
: Is the return address for the pattern writable ???
:
:   movzwl #SS$_ACCVIO, r0        ; Assume access violation
:   ifnowrt #4, @PATADR(ap), EXIT ; Branch if no write access
:
: Look up the appropriate erase pattern ...
:
:   movzwl #SS$_NORMAL, r0        ; Assume success at this point
:   movl   PATTERNSS[r1], @PATADR(ap) ; Send back the pattern
:
: That's all folks ...
:
EXIT:  popr  ^M<r1>                ; Restore registers
:   ret                                ; Return
:
: .END

```


The image displays a grid of 100 small terminal window screenshots, arranged in a 10x10 grid. Each window shows a different VAX/VMS command and its output. The windows are arranged in a 10x10 grid. Many windows have titles like 'LPMULT B32', 'DRMAST MAR', 'ADDRIVER MAR', 'TORIVER MAR', 'USSTEST MAR', 'GBLSECURF MAR', 'USSDISP MAR', 'DOD_ERAPAT MAR', 'LBRMAC MAR', 'XADDRIVER MAR', 'LABLOCIN MAR', 'DRSLU MAR', 'DTE_DF03 MAR', 'SECRET MAR', 'WORKO LIS', and 'EXAMPLES'. Each window displays text-based data, including system status, command execution results, and error messages.